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Abstract
This study examines the role of leading indicators in a managerial contracting setting. For the
purpose of incentive provision when the outcome of the manager’s activities are in the long run, the
use of leading indicators such as customer satisfaction is often observed. In the two-period contract
setting in this paper, I focus on the setting where those activities are manager-specific and the firm
can gain the outcome of the manager’s activities only when the manager stays at the firm in the
second period. Under this setting, I show the equilibrium cost to induce the manager to stay at
the firm and describe the role of leading indicators. Furthermore, I show the relationship between
manager-specific effort exerted in the first period and the effort incentive in the second period. I
show, in equilibrium, complementarity between the two kinds of efforts above does not necessarily
help improve the incentive of the manager-specific effort in the first period.
Key Words: Leading Indicators; Retention cost; Manager-specific effort;
Moral hazard; Short-term contracts; Effort substitution
1 Introduction
When the owner of a firm wants to motivate a manager from the long-term perspective, use of
leading indicators is often observed in practice as in Balanced Scorecard (e.g., Kaplan and Nor-
ton, 2006). The purpose of this paper is to show the roles of leading indicators and describe the
equilibrium level of efforts under the sequence of short-term contracts.
Christensen, Feltham and Sabac [2003] analyzed the sequence of short-term contracts and
showed that there is no pure strategy equilibrium the manager stays at the firm in the second pe-
riod unless the intertemporal correlation between performance measures used in the contract for
performance evaluation is zero.
In this paper, I consider the setting where the manager can access the labor market after the first
period. Therefore I analyze the contract regime is the sequence of short-term contracts, where the
owner offers one period contract at the beginning of each period. Under the sequence of short-term
contract setting, it is natural to think that it is costly to induce the manger to work for the same
company in the second period as well. In order to analyze the relevant cost and inefficiency caused
by the manager’s access to the labor market, I introduce the notion of retention cost, cost to induce
the manager to stay at the firm in the second period.
In order to analyze the inefficiency caused by the manager’s access to labor market, I introduce
the retention cost, the cost to induce the manager to stay in the second period, and thereby analyze
the equilibrium where the firm gains the outcome of the manager’s first period activity only when
the manager stays in the firm in the second period.
In classic moral hazard problems, the focus is on the tradeoff between incentive provision of
the agent and imposing risk on him (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979, 1982). Indjejikian and Nanda [1999]
analyzed the sequence of short-term contracts where performance measures in each period have
inter-temporal correlation. Under the sequence of short-term contracts scheme, Indjejikian and
Nanda [1999] showed that there is ratchet effect, a negative effect of use of nonfinancial perfor-
mance measures on first period effort. Sliwka [2002] also analyzed the weight on the performance
measures, especially on the leading indicators under the similar setting and showed that the weight
on leading indicators can be negative. As Christensen Feltham and Sabac [2003] pointed out, In-
1
djejikian and Nanda [1999] and Sliwka [2002] implicitly assumed the manager’s commitment to
stay, i.e., the manager is committed to stay at the firm in the second period even under a short-term
contract setting. Christensen, Feltham and Sabac [2003] argues that there are three kinds of relevant
commitment researchers should consider, commitment to the content to the contract, fairness of
contract1 and stay commitment. In this paper, I consider the setting where there is no stay commit-
ment but the owner have the opportunity to give the manager an offer that induces the manager to
stay at the firm. Kaplan and Norton [2006] emphasizes the use of nonfinancial performance mea-
sures such as leading indicators in Balanced Scorecoard. Christensen, Feltham and Sabac [2003]
showed that, under the sequence of short-term contracts, the mamager stays at the firm after the first
period unless intertemporal correlation equals zero.
Christensen, Feltham and Sabac [2003] analyzed a moral hazard problem in a two-period setting
and showed that there is no pure strategy equilibrium where the manager stays in the owner’s firm
in the second period unless performance measures in two periods have non-zero correlation.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I describe the basic model and char-
acterize the retention cost. In the third section, I examine the incentive and delegation problem
of pre-contract investment by adding the opportunity to make an investment decision before con-
tracting. In the forth section, I introduce the new assumption, the complementarity of efforts, and
analyze the relationship between retention cost and complementarity of efforts. In the sixth section,
I make concluding remarks.
2 Basic model
There are two players in this model, the risk-neutral owner of the firm and the risk-neutral manager.
The owner owns the assets to produce goods or service, but needs someone else, the manager, to
gain the outcome from those assets. The owner hires the manager for this purpose for as many
as two periods and the manager works for the manager. The owner’s objective from the contract
relationship with the manager is maximization of expected outcome net expected payment to the
manager.
1For fairness, see Baron and Besanko [1987] for example.
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The manager exerts the two kind of efforts: strategic effort in period one and operational effort
in period two, respectively2. I assume that the outcome of strategic effort cannot be delivered to the
firm unless the manager stays at the firm in the second period as well.
Now denote es ∈ R is the outcome of strategic effort incurring cost of effort 12 e2s , which the
manager chooses and pays in the first period. The outcome of strategic effort es realizes at the end
of the second period. I assume that es is unobservable. Importantly, strategic effort es is specific
to the manager hired in period 1. That is, the outcome of strategic effort is not delivered to the
firm when the manager leaves the firm after the first period and the owner hires another manager
for the second period. Let us denote eo ∈ R operational effort in period 2. Operational effort
is unobservable and incurs cost of effort 12 e
2
o. Operational effort is chosen by the manager in the
second period and realizes at the end of the second period.
The outcome of two kinds of effort, which is delivered to the firm at the end of the second
period, is jointly observed as follows: x = k · es + eo + εx, where k ≥ 0 is the productivity parameter
of strategic effort es and εx is a random variable subject to normal distribution with mean zero
and variance σ2. The outcome x is assumed to be observable and verifiable and therefore can be
contracted upon. Notice that the efficient effort levels are given by es = k, eo = 1.
Additionally, the performance measure s = es + εs realizes in the first period and is observable
and verifiable. The term εs is a random variable subject to normal distribution with mean zero and
variance σ2. This performance measure conveys the information regarding the strategic effort but
the outcome of strategic effort is delivered to the firm in the second period, so I call this performance
measure the leading indicator. I assume that there can be correlation between the noise terms in the
outcome and the leading indicator: τ = corr(εx, εs), where −1 ≤ τ ≤ 1. The correlation between
outcome and the leading indicator corresponds to the characteristics of prospective performance
measures such as customer satisfaction3.
At the beginning of each period, the owner offers the manager a one-period linear contract as
a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Let w1 = f1 + v1 · s denote the first period contract, where f1 is fixed
compensation and v1 is the coefficient for the leading indicator s. Similarly, let w2 = f2 + v2 · x
denote the second period contract, where f2 is fixed compensation and v2 is the coefficient for the
2The terminology follows Sliwka [2002]
3See Kaplan and Norton [1996] for detailed description on custmer satisfaction measures.
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outcome. I assume that wi is the alternative payoff for the manager in period i ∈ 1, 2.
As I mentioned above, Christensen, Feltham and Sabac[2003] showed that the manager does not
stay at the firm without a special case under the setting of sequence of short-term contracts. With
production technology and short-term contracts, it is optimal for the manager to gain the payoff
above the alternative payoff in the first period and leave the firm after the first period4．Now, I
assume that the owner can commit to pay the retention cost cs as follows. When the owner offers
the first period contract, the owner offers the retention cost cs, which is paid to the manager at
the beginning of the second period if the manager accepts the second period contract 5. On the
other hand, if the manager rejects the second period contract and leaves the firm, cs is not paid
to the manager. Additionally, I assume that the second period contract must cover the manager’s
alternative payoff in the second period, w2. Finally, the owner can precommit to the payment of
retention cost cs6.
Introduction of the retention cost is justified as follows. First, the strategic effort is specific to
the manger. That is, the owner does not gain the outcome of the strategic effort if the manager
leaves the firm. Therefore, it is natural to assume that the owner wants the opportunity to offer the
retention cost cs to induce the manager to stay at the firm in the second period. Second, I focus
on the setting where the manager can access the labor market after the first period. If I analyze the
long-term contract with or without commitment, it will be difficult to study the cost to induce the
manager to stay at the firm in the second period. For this purpose, I need the contract regime to be
the sequence of short-term contracts.
The sequence of events is as follows. First, the owner offers the first period contract and reten-
tion cost to the manager. Second, the manager decides to accept or reject the owner’s offer. If the
manager accept, the two parties enters the contract relationship. If the manager rejects, the relation-
ship immediately ends. Third, the manager exerts the strategic effort. Forth, the leading indicator
realizes and the compensation is paid to the manager according to the first period contract. Fifth,
4The model of Christensen et al. [2003] corresponds to the case of k = 0 in this paper. In their model (especially





2 by choosing the lower strategic effort than prescribed
by the owner. This is due to the fact that fixed payment covers the cost of strategic effort the owner wants the manager to
exert.
5Notice that the first period contract does not contain any portion of the second period contract, so the manager has
to decide to accept or reject the first period contract without any commitment or promise regarding the second period
contract.
6Of course, the choice of stay or leave is verifiable.
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the owner offers the second period contract to the manager. Sixth, the manager decides to accept
or reject the owner’s offer. If the manager accept, the two parties enters the contract relationship
in the second period and retention cost is paid to the manager according to the arrangement on the
retention cost in the first period. If the manager rejects, the relationship ends. Seventh, the manager
exerts the operational effort. Eighth, the outcome is delivered to the owner and the compensation is
payed to the manager according to the second period contract and contract relationship ends.
2.1 Solution to the basic model
Solution is fulfilled by backward induction.Before solving for equilibrium retention cost cs, I give
the description of the owner’s second period problem. The owner’s problem at the beginning of the
second period is as follows7:
max k · ês + e∗o + τ(s − ês) − E[ f2 + v2 · x]
subject to e∗o ∈ arg maxeo








2 ≥ w2. (PC2)
Note that hat means the conjecture throughout the paper. The first constraint (IC2) is the incen-
tive compatibility constraint. This constraint means that the operational effort is chosen optimally
by the manager. The second constraint (PC2) is the participation constraint. This constraint ensures
the manager’s expected payoff is not less than w2, his alternative payoff in the second period.
Because the manager is risk-neutral, the owner’s problem above involves no other tradeoff than
incentive provision of effort exertion. Therefore equilibrium effort and slope coefficient are given
by e∗o = 1, v
∗
2 = 1.
Next, I turn to the solution to retention cost. For preparation, let us focus on the manager’s
reaction to the first period contract ( f1, v1). The manager’s expected payoff from the contract rela-
7Note that, at the beginning of the second period, strategic effort es is the conjecture to the owner but is private
information to the manager who has chosen es in the first period.
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tionship with the owner is as follows:




2 + cs + w2 (if stay)




2 + w2, (if leave)
where e∗s,stay and e
∗
s,leave indicates the manager’s optimal choice of strategic effort if the manager
stays or leaves the firm after the first period, respectively. Hence I get the optimal choice of the
strategic effort in each case:
e∗s,stay = v1 + v
∗
2(k − τ) (if stay)
e∗s,leave = v1. (if leave)
Therefore, the manager optimally chooses to stay when the following inequality holds.














2 (k − τ)2. (2)
In equilibrium, the owner wants to minimize the retention cost cs. Therefore the optimal reten-





2 (k − τ)2 (3)
Additionally, incentive provision of strategic effort in the first period only requires effort cost. Then
I get the following equilibrium strategic effort level and the first period slope coefficient:
v∗1 = τ (4)
e∗s = k (5)
Hence I get the following proposition regarding the equilibrium retention cost and optimal slope
coefficients.
Proposition 1. Equilibrium retention cost is characterized by c∗s = 12 [v
∗
2]
2 (k − τ)2. Equilibrium




2.2 Stay or leave?: the owner’s optimal choice
When cs is too large, it may be optimal not to hire the same manager in both period. Therefore,
under the setting of this model where there is no other benefit to the owner from the manager’s
stay, it is optimal for the owner to induce the manager to stay when the following inequality holds.
For simplicity, I assume that the alternative payoff of the manager is zero (w1 = w2 = 0) in later
sections.












The equality holds in equilibrium, so the following is given.
Corollary 1.1. When k ≥ τ2 holds, it is optimal for the owner to induce the manager to stay at the
firm in the second period.
The corollary says that this constraint does not matter when k is large enough. In the later
section, I show that large k is not necessarily desirable.
3 Pre-contract investment
In this section, I consider the case where there is an opportunity to make an investment to the
productivity of the strategic effort. When starting an new project or installing a new business unit,
pre-contract investment is needed to acquire or improve productivity. In other situations, some
managers study in business school by financial support by the firm in order to improve their business
skills. Pre-contract investment analyzed in this section corresponds to these situations, which are
common to many organizations. Additionally, argument in this section is useful to understand the
equilibrium roles of retention cost and help understand the argument in the next section. In this
section I show the condition the manager prefers the pre-contract investment.
I assume that there is an investment opportunity to raise the productivity from k to k + a, where
a > 0 is constant and the both parties know the value of a. This investment incurs the cost da ≥ 0 to
the firm (the owner). This investment decision is assumed to be observable.
Before introducing the equilibrium, I examine the manager’s preference over this investment
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decision when the investment decision right is delegated to the manager. As shown in the above
proposition, the expected payoff from the contract relationship is w1 + w2 + c
∗
s irrespective of the
productivity of strategic effort k and equilibrium effort levels are efficient independent of k. There-
fore, the manager makes precontract investment when the following inequality holds.
1
2
(k + a − τ)2 ≥ 1
2
(k − τ)2. (7)
This reduces to:
a[a + 2(k − τ)] ≥ 0. (8)
Hence, the manager’s investment decision is described in the following corollary.
Corollary 1.2. When k ≤ τ, the manager prefers to make an investment in the domain 0 ≤ a ≤
−(k − τ) and does not otherwise. On the other hand, when k > τ, the manager always prefers to
invest8.
Let us consider the implication of this corollary. When k is sufficiently large, the manager
prefers to make an investment because the pre-contract investment increases the retention cost.
When k is smaller than τ, however, the manager may prefer not to make an pre-coctract investment
because the retention cost decreases by the investment. This corollary is useful when understand-
ing the various functions of the retention cost in equilibrium. Recall that the strategic effort is
manager-specific, say, the owner cannot acquire the outcome of the manager’s strategic effort. The
retention cost functions like hostage through the leaving opportunity of the manager. Additionally,
pre-contract investment changes the magnitude of the retention cost in various ways. Hence, the
retention cost varies with pre-contract investment, and thereby the manager does not necessarily
accept the pre-contract investment even when the productivity before investment is high.
4 Interaction between strategic effort and operational effort
In this section, I introduce the additional assumption, the interaction between strategic effort and
operational effort. I modify cost of operational effort as follows.
1
2
[e2o + 2p · es · eo], (9)
8In the domain of a < 0 it is optimal not to invest, but this possibility is precluded by the assumption a > 0.
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where −1 < p < 1 is the degree of complementarity or substitutability9 between strategic effort
es and operational effort eo. Generally, efforts are called substitutes when p > 0 and complement
p < 010. Notice that cost of operational effort above incurs in the second period. This corresponds
the case the cost of operational effort varies with the strategic effort exerted in the first period. There
is no other additional assumption.
Before describing the equilibrium, let us see the efficient result. Efficient effort levels maximiz-
ing the joint surplus are given as follows.
ees = k − p (10)
eeo = 1 − p · ees (11)
Expected joint surplus is given as follows.
k · es + eo −
1
2
[e2s + 2p · es · eo + e2o] (12)
with eo = 1 − p · es (13)
In this section, the manager’s optimal choice of operational effort is efficient as in the basic
model. Therefore the owner’s problem at the beginning of the first periodis as follows.
max
f1,v1, f2,v2
k · es + eo −
1
2
[e2s + 2p · es · eo + e2o] − cs
subject to e∗o = 1 − p · e∗s (IC2)










[{e∗o}2 + 2p · es · e∗o] (IC1)
E[ f ∗1 + v
∗




2 ≥ w1 (PC1)










The first constraint (IC2) is incentive compatibility constraint for the choice of the manager’s
operational effort in the second period. (IC1) is the incentive compatibility constraint for the man-
ager’s strategic effort, optimized for the maximization of his expected payoff from the contract
9The similar setting appears in Dikkoli et al. [2009]
10See Vives [1999] for details.
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relationship and cost of strategic effort and operational effort. Notice that cost of operational effort
depends on the choice of strategic effort, which is chosen in the first period. The constraint (PC1)
is for the manager’s acceptance of the second period. As in the basic model, the owner needs to
ensure the manager his alternative payoff. Thee last constraint (stay) ensures that the manager stays
at the owner’s firm in the second period.
The solution to the owner’s problem above is similar to that of the basic model. Hence, I get the
following proposition on equilibrium effort levels and slope coefficients.
Proposition 2. Equilibrium effort levels are introduced as follows:
e∗s =
v∗1 + (k − τ − p)
1 − p2 , (14)
e∗o = 1 − p · e∗s. (15)
Equilibrium slope coefficients are given as follows.
v∗1 =
τ − (k − p) · p2
1 − p2 + p4 , (16)
v∗2 = 1. (17)
proof. The proof is by straight forward algebra as in the basic model. 
The case of p = 0 is equivalent to the basic model in section 2. Similar to the basic model,
there is no other tradeoff than effort exertion. Therefore, equilibrium slope coefficient in the second
period contract is v∗2 = 1. In this section, there is interaction between strategic effort and operational
effort because cost of operational effort depends on the strategic effort chosen in the first period.
Strategic effort es is motivated both by v1 · s, the bonus in the first period contract, and by
v2 · x, the bonus in the second period contract. As mentioned earlier in this section, efficient level of
strategic effort is k− p. However, conditional expected outcome after observing first period signal s
is E[x | s] = k · es + eo + τ(s− es). Therefore v1 is chosen to compensate for ratchet effect of portion
of the second period contract −v2 · τ.












Figure 1: Equilibrium strategic effort
When p < 0 is negative, i.e., efforts are complementary, strategic effort reduces the cost of
operational effort. On the other hand, when efforts are substitute (p is positive), strategic effort
increases cost of operational effort. So it is natural to guess that equilibrium strategic effort decreases
in p. However, as shown in figure 1, the optimal strategic effort in the case of τ = 0.5 and k = 1
reaches the peak at the intermediate value between −1 < p < 0, and is not monotonically decreasing
in p.
Observation 1. When τ = 0.5, k = 1, e∗s takes its maximum at −1 < p < 0.
This fact is in contrast to the intuition above. In order to examine the mechanism behind this
observation, I analyze retention cost and the expected payoff below.
For preparation of the analysis, let us see the slope coefficient of the leading indicator, v∗1, in the
proposition above.
v∗1 =
τ − (k − p) · p2
1 − p2 + p4 . (18)
Straight forward algebra gives the following corollary on the sign of v∗1.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium retention cost
Corollary 2.1. The sign of the equilibrium slope coefficient in the first period contract is:
v∗1 < 0 if τ < (k − p) · p2 (19)
v∗1 ≥ 0 if τ ≥ (k − p) · p2. (20)
It can be said that v∗1 is negative when k is sufficiently large. Similar to Sliwka [2002], the slope
coefficient in the first period contract can be negative. Second period contract faces no tradeoff, so
the second period slope coefficient v∗2 is set to induce the efficient strategic effort incentive minus
ratchet effect accompanied. The first period bonus functions to compensate for this ratchet effect.
This corollary is not enough to explain the non-monotonicity of optimal strategic effort in p in figure
1. Now I turn to the examination of retention cost.









2 − v∗1 · e∗s, (21)
with e∗s =
v∗1 + (k − τ − p)
1 − p2 (22)
and v∗1 =
τ − (k − p) · p2
1 − p2 + p4 . (23)
Now look at figure 2, an example of retention cost (k = 1).
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Observation 2. Equilibrium retention cost takes its maximum at some intermediate value −1 < p <
0.
Observation of figure 2 tells that retention cost is maximized at some point in −1 < p < 0.
This corresponds to the fact that strategic effort takes its maximum at some point in −1 < p < 0.
Basically, strategic effort is magnified by the degree of complementarity, say −p. However, when
p is sufficiently close to −1, motivating strategic effort is too costly in the sense that retention cost
is too large. Therefore, when the degree of complementarity is extremely large, the owner refrains
from fully motivating the strategic effort.
Next turn to the consideration on the relationship between retention cost and intertemporal cor-
relation τ. The figure 2 shows that equilibrium retention cost is decreasing in intertemporal correla-
tion τ. General result on this fact is the following corollary.
Corollary 2.2. Equilibrium retention cost is decreasing in intertemporal correlation τ ∀k.
proof. Proof is by straightforward algebra. 
Before concluding this section, let us see owner’s expected payoff in the case of positive in-
tertemporal correlation τ = 0.5. Positive correlation corresponds to usual cases such as customer
satisfaction, where it is often said that there is positive correlation between future performance and
a current customer satisfaction measure.
Next observation describes the owner’s expected payoff under positive intertemporal correlation.
Observation 3. When k = 1 and τ = 0.5 > 0, the owner’s expected payoff is largest at negative
degree of complementarity or substitution, p.
As I have described above, equilibrium retention cost is larger when efforts are more com-
plement. Additionally, when efforts are sufficiently complement, the owner does not provide the
manager with much incentive of strategic effort, because retention cost is too large if she is to do so.
This tendency of low powered incentive of strategic effort is greater the degree of complementarity
is the greater, i.e., p is the more close to −1.
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Figure 3: Owner’s expected payoff
5 Conclusion
In this paper I have described the equilibrium managerial retention cost when the stay commitment
mentioned in Christensen, Feltham and Sabac [2003] is absent and the owner can commit to the
payment of the managerial retention cost, which is payed to the manager if the manager stays at
the firm in the second period. Prior research treated the intertemporal correlation between the first
period performance measures and the second period performance measures/outcome and analyzed
the equilibrium effort incentives under the existence of what is called ratchet effect. I introduced
into the prior models the complementarity or substitutability between efforts, especially strategic
effort exerted in the first period and operational effort exerted in the second period.
The main result of this paper is that the complementarity of efforts does not necessarily improves
the expected payoff of the owner of the firm. This result is in clear contrast to the intuition that effort
complementarity improves the effort incentives.
There may be some obstacles to the future research. The description in this model is too complex
to mathematically treat and apply to other settings. However, the function of the retention cost in
14
this model is significant and seems to have many fruitful extensions in the future. Therefore one
of the future objectives in this line of this research contains the construction of the foundation of
applied models using the notion of retention cost.
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Accounting: a comment. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 35:423–436, 2003.
[2] Dikolli S. S., C. Hofmann and S. L. Kulp. Interrelated Performance Measures, Interactive Effort,
and Incentive Weights. JMAR, 21:125–149, 2009.
[3] Holmstrom B. Moral Hazard and Observability. Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1):74–91, 1979.
[4] Holmstrom B. Moral Hazard in Teams. Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2):324–340, 1982.
[5] Indjejikian R. and D. Nanda. Dynamic Incentives and Responsibility Accounting. Journal of
Accounting and Economics, 27(2):177–201, 1999.
[6] Kaplan R. S. and D. P. Norton. Alignment: Using the Balanced Scorecard to Create Corporate
Synergies. Harvard Business School Press, 2006.
[7] Sliwka D. On The Use of Nonfinancial Performance Measures in The Management Compen-
sation. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 11(3):487–511, 2002.
[8] Vives X. Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts., 1999.
15
